Regulatory Rules to Neutralize Network Dominance

Nicholas Economides (), Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo and Glenn Woroch ()

Working Papers from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper evaluates the effectiveness of several pricing rules intended to promote entry into a network industry dominated by an incumbent carrier. Drawing on the work of Cournot and Hotelling, we develop a model of competition between two interconnected networks.

Keywords: PRICING; COMPETITION; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ste:nystbu:96-14

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