How should we incentivize private landowners to "produce" more biodive rsity?
Paul R Armsworth,
Simanti Banerjee (),
Nick Hanley () and
Gareth D Lennox
No 2012-02, Stirling Economics Discussion Papers from University of Stirling, Division of Economics
Globally, much biodiversity is found on private land. Acting to conserve such biodiversity thus requires the design of policies which influence the decision-making of farmers and foresters. In this paper, we outline the economic characteristics of this problem, before reviewing a number of policy options such as conservation auctions and conservation easements. We then discuss a number of policy design problems, such as need for spatial coordination and the choice between paying for outcomes rather than actions, before summarizing what the evidence and theory developed to date tells us about those aspects of biodiversity policy design which need careful attention from policy makers and environmental regulators.
Keywords: biodiversity; policy design; conservation auctions; agglomeration bonu s (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: How should we incentivize private landowners to ‘produce’ more biodiversity? (2012)
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