Corporate governance, firm performance and type of ownership
Anders Ekeland ()
No 200215, STEP Report series from The STEP Group, Studies in technology, innovation and economic policy
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to discuss the relationship between theory and data in the corporate governance literature from a policy perspective. This is a literature dominated by a neo-classical approach to economic issues. Does the empirical work done in this tradition confirm the claim that corporate governance understood as an agency problem is important for the creation of wealth, for the performance of firms, and consequently for economic growth? More precisely, it is the importance of certain structural characteristics of firms that are regarded as proxies for various aspects of the agency problem that are analysed. There seems to be a consensus among the researchers in neo-classical tradition that ownership characteristics, like ownership concentration, type of owner, inside/outside ownership are predicted by the underlying theory to be the most important factors for corporate governance.
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