Rationalising ‘'Irrational'' Support for Political Violence

Colin Jennings

No 1212, Working Papers from University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material beneÂ…fit. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrfiÂ…ce in choosing peace.

Keywords: confl‡ict; emotions; reciprocity; expressive (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2012-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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