Alex Dickson ()
No 1701, Working Papers from University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics
Consider an environment in which individuals are organised into groups, they contribute to the collective action of their group, and are influenced by the collective actions of other groups; there are externalities between groups that are transmitted through the aggregation of groupsâ€™ actions. The theory of â€˜aggregative gamesâ€™ has been successfully applied to study games in which playersâ€™ payoffs depend only on their own strategy and a single aggregation of all playersâ€™ strategies, but the setting just described features multiple aggregations of actionsâ€”one for each groupâ€”in which the nature of the intra-group strategic interaction may be very different to the inter-group strategic interaction. The aim of this contribution is to establish a framework within which to consider such â€˜multiple aggregate gamesâ€™; present a method to analyse the existence and properties of Nash equilibria; and to discuss some applications of the theory to demonstrate how useful the technique is for analysing strategic interactions involving individuals in groups.
Keywords: aggregative game; group interaction; contests; public goods; bilateral oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 D72 H41 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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