Rent dissipation in share contests
Alex Dickson (),
Ian MacKenzie () and
Petros Sekeris ()
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Alex Dickson: Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde
No 2014, Working Papers from University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics
This article investigates rent dissipationâ€”the total costs of rent seeking in relation to the value of the contested rentâ€”in share contests. We consider preferences that are more general than usually assumed in the literature, which allow for contestants to have diminishing marginal utility. With sufficiently concave preferences the equilibrium will feature over-dissipation if the rent is small, and under-dissipation if the rent is large: if contestants have strong diminishing marginal utility and they are contesting a small rent they are highly sensitive to changes in their allocation of the rent so are relatively effortful in contesting it; by contrast when the rent is large they are less effortful relative to the size of the rent. Thus, the inclusion of diminishing marginal utility allows us to reconcile the Tullock paradoxâ€”where rent-seeking levels are observed to be relatively small compared to the contested rentâ€”with observed over-dissipation of rents in, for example, experimental settings. We also propose a more general rent dissipation measure that applies to any contest and is suitable for general preferences.
Keywords: Rent seeking; rent dissipation; share contests. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:str:wpaper:2014
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