Bargaining over time in ultimatum game experiments

Roger Berger, Heiko Rauhut (rauhut@gess.ethz.ch), Sandra Prade and Dirk Helbing

No CCSS-10-002, Working Papers from ETH Zurich, Chair of Systems Design

Abstract: We report the first ultimatum game experiment with bargaining over waiting time. The experiment was created to avoid effects of windfall gains. In contrast to donated money, time is not endowed by the experimenter and implies a natural loss to the subjects. This allows for a better measurement of the inherent conflict in the ultimatum game. We implemented three anonymity conditions; one baseline condition, one condition with anonymity among the subjects and one double-blind condition in which the experimenter did not know the division of waiting time. While we expected to observe less other-regarding behavior in ultimatum game bargaining over time, our experimental results rather confirm previous ultimatum game experiments, in which people bargained over money. The modal offer was half of the waiting time and only one offer was rejected. Interestingly, anonymity did not change the results significantly. In conclusion, our experiment confirms other-regarding behavior in the ultimatum game.

Keywords: bargaining over time; ultimatum game; loss; anonymity; fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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