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Tactical voting in plurality elections

Nuno A. M. Araujo, Jose S. Andrade and Hans J. Herrmann ()

No CCSS-10-006, Working Papers from ETH Zurich, Chair of Systems Design

Abstract: How often will elections end in landslides and what is the probability for a head-to-head race? Analyzing ballot results from several large countries rather anomalous and yet unexplained distributions have been observed. We identify tactical voting as the driving ingredient for the anomalies and introduce a model to study its effect on plurality elections, characterized by the relative strength of the feedback from polls and the pairwise interaction between individuals in the society. With this model it becomes possible to explain the polarization of votes between two candidates, understand the small margin of victories frequently observed for different elections, and analyze the polls impact in American, Canadian, and Brazilian ballots. Moreover, the model reproduces, quantitatively, the distribution of votes obtained in the Brazilian mayor elections with two, three, and four candidates.

Keywords: opinion; dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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