Public Debt Maturity and Currency Crises

Paul Levine (), Alex (Alexandros) Mandilaras and Jun Wang
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Jun Wang: University of Surrey

No 406, School of Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Surrey

Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical and empirical examination of the e®ect of debt structure on the probability of a currency crisis and the slope of the yield curve. We employ an open-economy version of the Barro-Gordon model with public debt, as in Benigno and Missale (2004) and generalize the analysis to allow for the case where the monetary authority can fully commit itself to an escape clause monetary rule. Comparing the latter with the discretionary outcomes motivates the asymmetric information game where the signalling e®ect of defending the parity competes with the fundamentals of the debt burden. Two key predictions of the model are tested with positive results.

Keywords: Currency crisis; debt management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2006-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-fmk, nep-mac, nep-mon, nep-pbe and nep-sea
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https://repec.som.surrey.ac.uk/2006/DP04-06.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: PUBLIC DEBT MATURITY AND CURRENCY CRISES (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sur:surrec:0406

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