Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade

Holger Breinlichy, Volker Nockez and Nicolas Schutzx
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Holger Breinlichy: University of Surrey, CEP and CEPR
Volker Nockez: University of Mannheim, NBER and CEPR
Nicolas Schutzx: University of Mannheim and CEPR

No 818, School of Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Surrey

Abstract: In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to bene t domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. We calibrate the model to match industry-level data in the U.S. and Canada. Our results suggest that at present levels of trade costs, merger policy is too tough in the vast majority of sectors. We also quantify the resulting externalities and study the impact of di erent regimes of coordinating merger policies at varying levels of trade costs.

JEL-codes: F12 F13 L13 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2018-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-int
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sur:surrec:0818

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