Should It Be Curtains for Some of the IMF’s Lending Windows?

Graham Bird and Dane Rowlands

No 905, School of Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Surrey

Abstract: Increasing attention is being paid to IMF governance, and the structure and size of the Fund’s lending operations. However, less interest has been shown in the array of lending windows through which the IMF makes resources available. There have nonetheless been clear trends over recent years in the extent to which the windows are used. What discussion has occurred has been largely qualitative. In this paper, and as far as the data allow, we adopt a quantitative approach and focus on the extent to which the economic circumstances in which countries sign extended and concessionary arrangements differ from those in which they sign conventional stand bys. On this basis, we claim that there is a strong case for discontinuing the EFF but for continuing the PRGF. The paper also discusses, more broadly, reforms to the structure of the IMF’s lending windows.

JEL-codes: F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2005-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk
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Journal Article: Should it be curtains for some of the IMF’s lending windows? (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sur:surrec:0905

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