Truth-Tracking Judgment Aggregation Over Interconnected Issues
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Irem Bozbay: University of Surrey
No 916, School of Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Surrey
This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnected issues. Voters share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private information about what the truth might be. Information conflicts may occur both between and within voters. Following Bozbay, Dietrich and Peters (2014), we assume strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting and we want to determine voting rules which induces an ecient Bayesian Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies, hence lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. Unlike in judgment aggregation problems with two independent issues where it is always possible to aggregate information eciently, efficient information aggregation is not always possible with interconnected issues. We characterize the (rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as the nature of these rules.
JEL-codes: C70 D70 D71 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-sog
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sur:surrec:0916
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