Selfish Bureaucrats and Policy Heterogeneity in Nordhaus’ DICE

Richard Tol

Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School

Abstract: Nordhaus’ seminal DICE model assesses first-best climate policy, a useful but unrealistic yardstick. I propose a measure of policy inefficacy if carbon prices are heterogeneous and use observed prices to recalibrate the DICE model. I introduce a model of climate policy with selfish bureaucrats, and calibrate it to carbon dioxide emissions in the European Union and the policy models used by the IPCC. This model also implies a measure of policy inefficacy that I use to recalibrate DICE. The global mean temperature is 1 perhaps 2 degrees Celsius higher in the recalibrated than in the original DICE model.

Keywords: climate policy; price heterogeneity; selfish bureaucrats (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
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Related works:
Chapter: SELFISH BUREAUCRATS AND POLICY HETEROGENEITY IN NORDHAUS’ DICE (2021)
Journal Article: SELFISH BUREAUCRATS AND POLICY HETEROGENEITY IN NORDHAUS’ DICE (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sus:susewp:0220

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