Determinants of Ownership Concentration and Tender Offer Law in the Chilean Stock Market

Marco Morales

No 1, Serie de Documentos de Trabajo from Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros

Abstract: This paper analyzes econometrically the determinants of ownership concentration in the Chilean stock market, with particular attention to the e¤ects of the Tender Offer Law (OPA law). Even though the central pourpose of OPAs Law is achieved, the tender offer mechanism increases the ownership concentration. The main reason for this effect has to do with the "residual OPA" obligation considered by the law.

Keywords: Ownership Concentration; Payout Policy; Minority Shareholders; Tender Offer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 G35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
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