Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games

Carlos Pimienta ()

No 2007-31, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: This paper shows that the set of probability distributions over networks induced by Nash equilibria of the network formation game proposed by Myerson (1991) is finite for a generic assignment of payoffs to networks. The same result can be extended to several variations of the game found in the literature.

Keywords: Networks; generic finiteness; Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D85 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:swe:wpaper:2007-31

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