Bayesian and Consistent Assessments

Carlos Pimienta ()

No 2009-13, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: In a Bayesian assessment beliefs are computed from the strategy profile following Bayes’ rule at positive probability information sets and for every subgame. We characterize the set of extensive-forms (extensive-form games without a payoff assignment) for which the sets of Bayesian assessments and consistent assessments coincide. In doing so we disentangle the different restrictions imposed by consistency across information sets.

Keywords: Backwards induction; Bayesian assessments; Consistent assessments; Sequential equilibrium; Extensive-forms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Bayesian and consistent assessments (2014)
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