Aspects of Bureaucratic Corruption
No 2010-14, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales
This review attempts to identify treatments of corruption that draw upon characteristics of underdevelopment either as causes or as consequences. It focuses on three aspects of corruption in developing economies: red tape, rent-seeking, and the abundance of intermediaries. Red tape is presented as arising from differences in ability-to-pay and willingness-to-pay, which is a consequence of incomplete or absent markets in LDCs. Rent-seeking is viewed as a reason for inefficient allocation of resources. We emphasise that there is very little analysis of intermediation, but analysis is necessary to understand the structure of corruption markets.
Keywords: Bureaucratic Corruption; Red Tape; Middlemen; Rent Seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 O12 O17 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:swe:wpaper:2010-14
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