Pandering and Electoral Competition

Gabriele Gratton

No 2012-22B, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: We study an election with two perfectly informed candidates. Voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election, but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them. Voters elect one of the candidates, effectively choosing between the two policies proposed by the candidates. We explore under which conditions candidates always propose the voters’ optimal policy. The model is extended to include strategic voting, policy-motivated candidates, imperfectly informed candidates, and heterogeneous preferences.

Keywords: pandering; elections; information aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2013-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Pandering and electoral competition (2014)
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