Self-regulating organizations under the shadow of governmental oversight: An experimental investigation

Silvester Van Koten and Andreas Ortmann

No 2013-13, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as the accounting, financial, and legal professions. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show theoretically that SROs can create monopoly market power for their affiliated agents, but that governmental oversight, even if less efficient than oversight by the SRO, can largely offset the market power. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture. For carefully rationalized parameterizations and implementation details, we find that the predictions of DeMarzo et al. (2005) are borne out.

Keywords: Experimental Economics; Self-regulating organizations; Governmental oversight (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 G18 G28 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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