Strategic Stability in Poisson Games

Francesco De Sinopoli, Claudia Meroni and Carlos Pimienta (c.pimienta@unsw.edu.au)

No 2014-09, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: In Poisson games, an extension of perfect equilibrium based on perturbations of the strategy space does not guarantee that players use admissible actions. This observation suggests that such a class of perturbations is not the correct one. We characterize the right space of perturbations to define perfect equilibrium in Poisson games. Furthermore, we use such a space to define the corresponding strategically stable sets of equilibria. We show that they satisfy existence, admissibility, and robustness against iterated deletion of dominated strategies and inferior replies.

Keywords: Poisson games; voting; perfect equilibrium; strategic stability; stable sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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