Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi-Item Multi-Unit Auctions - An experimental study

Regina Betz, Ben Greiner, Sascha Schweitzer () and Stefan Seifert ()
Additional contact information
Sascha Schweitzer: University of Bayreuth
Stefan Seifert: University of Bayreuth

No 2014-31, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: We experimentally study the effect of auction format (sealed-bid vs. closed clock vs. open clock) and auction sequence (simultaneous vs. sequential) on bidding behaviour and auction outcomes in auctions of multiple related multi-unit items. Prominent field applications are the sale of emission permits, fishing rights, and electricity. We find that, when auctioning simultaneously, clock auctions outperform sealed-bid auctions in terms of efficiency and revenues. This advantage disappears when the items are auctioned sequentially. In addition, auctioning sequentially has positive effects on total revenues across all auction formats, resulting from fiercer competition on the item auctioned first.

Keywords: emission permits; auction design; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D44 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions: An Experimental Study (2017)
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