Intimidation: Linking Negotiation and Conflict

Sambuddha Ghosh (), Gabriele Gratton and Caixia Shen ()
Additional contact information
Sambuddha Ghosh: Department of Economics, Boston university
Caixia Shen: School of International Business Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

No 2015-07B, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: A challenger wants a resource initially held by a defender, who can negotiate a settlement by offering to share the resource. If challenger rejects, conflict ensues. During conflict each player could be a tough type for whom fighting is costless. Therefore non-concession intimidates the opponent into conceding. Unlike in models where negotiations happen in the shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, the rejected offer determines how conflict is played if negotiations fail. In turn, how players are expected to play during conflict determines their negotiating positions. In equilibrium, negotiations always fail with positive probability, even if players face a high cost of conflict. Allowing multiple offers leads to brinkmanship—the only acceptable offer is the one made when conflict is imminent. If negotiations fail, conflict is prolonged and non-duration dependent.

Keywords: Intimidation; reputation; terrorism; negotiation; brinkmanship; costly war-of-attrition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2018-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2015-07B.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: INTIMIDATION: LINKING NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT (2019)
Working Paper: Intimidation: Linking Negotiation and Conflict (2015)
Working Paper: Intimidation: Linking Negotiation and Conflict (2015)
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