Reaching Consensus Through Simultaneous Bargaining

Jean-François Laslier, Matias Nuñez and Carlos Pimienta ()

No 2015-08, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: We propose a two-player bargaining game where each player simultaneously proposes a set of lotteries on a finite set of alternatives. If the two sets have elements in common the outcome is selected by the uniform probability measure over the intersection. If otherwise the sets do not intersect the outcome is selected by the uniform probability measure over the union. We show that this game always has an equilibrium in sincere strategies (i.e. such that players truthfully reveal their preferences). We also prove that every equilibrium is individually rational and consensual. If furthermore players are partially honest then every equilibrium is efficient and sincere. We use this result to fully characterize the set of equilibria of the game under partial honesty.

Keywords: Approval voting; bargaining; partial honesty; consensual equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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