An Equilibrium Model of General Practitioner Payment Schemes

Donald Wright

No 2012-12, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: In an environment where GPs are of differing quality and heterogeneous patients have di?erent preferences for quality, it is shown that fee-for-service coupled with balance billing is a superior payment scheme to just fee-for-service or capitation payments as it generates an e?cient allocation of GPs between high and low quality and an e?cient allocation of patients between GPs. Where patients have more than one condition it is shown that fee-for-service allows patients to seek treatment from GPs of di?ering quality conditional on the medical condition they have.

Keywords: General; Practitioner; Payment; Schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: An Equilibrium Model of General Practitioner Payment Schemes (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/8583

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