League-Table Incentives and Price Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets

Stephen Cheung and Andrew Coleman

No 2012-13, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: We study experimental markets in which participants face incentives modeled upon those prevailing in markets for managed funds. Each participant's portfolio is periodically evaluated at market value and ranked by their relative performance as measured by short-term paper returns. Those who rank highly attract a larger share of new fund inflows. In an environment in which prices are typically close to intrinsic value, the effect of these incentives is mild. However in an environment in which markets are prone to bubble, mispricing is greatly exacerbated by relative performance incentives, and even becomes more pronounced with experience.

Keywords: asset market experiments; managed funds markets; price bubbles; relative performance incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: League-Table Incentives and Price Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets (2011)
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