Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution

Jonathan Newton and Simon Angus ()

No 2013-02, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: This study considers pure coordination games on networks and the waiting time for an adaptive process of strategic change to achieve efficient coordination. Although it is in the interest of every player to coordinate on a single globally efficient norm, coalitional behavior at a local level can greatly slow, as well as hasten convergence to efficiency. For some networks, when one action becomes efficient enough relative to the other, the effect of coalitional behavior changes abruptly from a conservative effect to a reforming effect. These effects are confirmed for a variety of stylized and empirical social networks found in the literature. For coordination games in which the Pareto efficient and risk dominant equilibria differ, polymorphic states can be the only stochastically stable states.

Keywords: social networks; networks; conservatism; reform; social norm; coalition; learning; Stochastic stability; Evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution (2015)
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