Cheap talk and editorial control

Jonathan Newton

No 2013-01, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes simple models of editorial control. Starting from the framework developed by Krishna and Morgan (2001a), we analyze 2-sender models of cheap talk where one or more of the senders has the power to veto messages before they reach the receiver. A characterization of the most informative equilibria of such models is given. It is shown that editorial control never aids communication and that for small biases in the senders' preferences relative to those of the receiver, necessary and sufficient conditions for information transmission to be adversely affected are (i) that the senders have opposed preferences relative to the receiver, and (ii) that both senders have powers of editorial control. It is shown that the addition of further senders beyond two weakly decreases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are anonymous, and weakly increases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are observed.

Keywords: Wikipedia; editorial control; Cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cheap Talk and Editorial Control (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/8896

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