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Timing Tax Evasion

Dirk Niepelt ()

No 04.07, Working Papers from Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee

Abstract: Standard models of tax evasion implicitly assume that evasion is either fully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case, casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior evasion choices. I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior tax evasion rates: Fines depending on the duration of an evasion spell, and different vintages of income sources subject to aggregate risk and fixed costs when switched between evasion states. The dynamic approach yields a transparent representation of revenue losses and social costs due to tax evasion, novel findings on the effect of policy on tax evasion, and a tractable framework for the analysis of tax evasion dynamics.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2004-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-dge, nep-pub and nep-reg
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