Timing Tax Evasion
Dirk Niepelt ()
No 04.07, Working Papers from Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee
Standard models of tax evasion implicitly assume that evasion is either fully detected, or not detected at all. Empirically, this is not the case, casting into doubt the traditional rationales for interior evasion choices. I propose two alternative, dynamic explanations for interior tax evasion rates: Fines depending on the duration of an evasion spell, and different vintages of income sources subject to aggregate risk and fixed costs when switched between evasion states. The dynamic approach yields a transparent representation of revenue losses and social costs due to tax evasion, novel findings on the effect of policy on tax evasion, and a tractable framework for the analysis of tax evasion dynamics.
Pages: 26 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-dge, nep-pub and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.szgerzensee.ch/fileadmin/Dateien_Anwend ... g_papers/wp-0407.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Timing tax evasion (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:szg:worpap:0407
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Studienzentrum Gerzensee, Postfach 21, 3115 Gerzensee
The price is Free.
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee Studienzentrum Gerzensee, Postfach 21, 3115 Gerzensee.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by library ().