Why do people sometimes not keep their promises?

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Stefano Papa and Francesco Passarelli

No 121, CIMEO, Sapienza University of Rome from Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome

Keywords: Promises; trust; moral obligation; cognitive biases; guilt aversion; psychological games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
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