Miscommunication in an investment game with one-way messages
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and
Stefano Papa ()
wp.comunite from Department of Communication, University of Teramo
This paper aims to study the effects of free-form messages (cheap talk) in an investment game as Berg et al. (1995). We guess that messages matter, but they may not affect the outcomes on average because different outcomes of communication can be systematically misunderstood generating different effects that offset each other. Considering a non-binary choice game, where misunderstandings are more likely to be observed, we test our intuition in two steps. First, we classify messages by their contents and then we verify their impact on participants’ behavior accordingly to their kind.
Keywords: Trust; reciprocity; promises; requests; empty talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:00123
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