Rational vs. long-run forecasters: Optimal monetary policy and the role of inequality
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and
Carolina Serpieri ()
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This paper builds a stylized simple sticky-price New Keynesian model where agents' beliefs are not homogeneous. We assume that agents choose optimal plans while considering forecasts of macroeconomic conditions over an infinite horizon. A fraction of them (boundedly rational agents) use heuristics to forecast macroeconomic variables over an infinite horizon. In our framework, we study optimal policies consistent with a second-order approximation of the policy objective from the consumers' utility function, assuming that the steady state is not distorted.
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Journal Article: RATIONAL VS. LONG-RUN FORECASTERS: OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND THE ROLE OF INEQUALITY (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:00129
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