The macroeconomics of social pacts
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and
Patrizio Tirelli ()
wp.comunite from Department of Communication, University of Teramo
In this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade unions, the central bank and the fiscal policymaker. We explicitly model unions’ concern for public expenditure, paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the unions, i.e. the so-called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of European countries in the last few decades. We also highlight the profoundly different incentives generated by institutional arrangements such as the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. The former has unambiguously induced more efficient outcomes; the latter is likely to backfire!
Keywords: Corporatism; trade unions; fiscal policy; monetary conservativeness; policy game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E58 E61 E62 E64 H30 J51 J58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-mac
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Journal Article: The macroeconomics of social pacts (2009)
Working Paper: The macroeconomics of social pacts (2009)
Working Paper: The macroeconomics of social pacts (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:0028
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