Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (),
Andrew Hughes Hallett () and
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This paper shows the relationship between static controllability (the well-known Tinbergen golden rule), and the existence and other properties of the Nash equilibrium in a dynamic setting with rational expectations for future behavior. We show how to determine the existence of equilibrium outcomes; the conditions under which no equilibrium exists; and who will get to dominate (or who will find their policies to have become ineffective) in those equilibria, without having to compute and enumerate all the possible equilibria directly.
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Journal Article: Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:0034
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