The existence of Nash equilibria in n-player LQ-games, with applications to international monetary and trade agreements
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (),
Nicola Acocella and
Andrew Hughes Hallett ()
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The paper studies the relationship between equilibrium existence in LQ games and the classical theory of economic policy, generalizing some recent results. In particular, by focusing on system controllability instead of the controllability by one or some of the players, we find conditions for the existence of the Nash equilibrium that extend those required by the previous literature. The usefulness of our results is described by some examples in the field of international monetary and trade agreements.
JEL-codes: C72 E52 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-gth, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:0040
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