A simple framework for investigating the properties of policy games

Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and Nicola Acocella ()

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Abstract: The paper extensively studies the static model of non-cooperative linear quadratic games in which a set of agents chooses their instruments strategically to minimize their linear quadratic criterion. We first derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium as well as for multiple equilibria to arise. Furthermore, we study the general condition for policy neutrality and Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium by introducing a new concept of decisiveness.

Keywords: Conflict of interest; Nash equilibrium existence; multiplicity; policy invariance; controllability; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hap, nep-ltv and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:0059

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