Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games

Guzzini Enrico and Antonio Palestrini ()

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Abstract: In this paper, we consider the Coase theorem in a non cooperative game framework. In particular, we explore the robustness of the Coase theorem with respect to the ?nal distribution of alienable property rights which constitutes, as far as we know, a less cultivated ?eld of research. In our framework, in order to reach e¢ ciency, agents have to stipulate binding contracts. In the analysis, we distinguish between permanent and temporary contracts showing the di¤erent implication of the two kinds of contracts with respect to the ?nal attribution of individual rights. More precisely, we show that, with temporary binding contracts and under particular assumptions, the ?nal attribution if individual rights does not converge.

Keywords: Coase theorem; binding contracts; side payments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games (2012)
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