N-Dimensional Blotto Game with Asymmetric Battlefield Values
Caroline Thomas ()
No 130116, Department of Economics Working Papers from The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics
This paper introduces a new geometric method for constructing equilibrium distributions in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric battlefield values, generalizing the construction method of Laslier and Picard (2002). Our method does particularly well in instances of the Colonel Blotto game in which the battlefield values satisfy some clearly defined regularity conditions. The paper establishes the parallel between these conditions and the constrained integer partitioning problem in combinatorial optimisation. We illustrate in the context of the US presidential elections the properties of equilibrium distributions generated by our construction method. In a numerical example, we address the equity of campaign resource allocations.
Date: 2009-12, Revised 2016-12
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https://sites.google.com/site/carotho14/research/files/20161202_Blotto.pdf Revised version, 2016 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tex:wpaper:130116
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