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Strategic Experimentation in Queues

Caroline Thomas () and Martin Cripps

No 140228, Department of Economics Working Papers from The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic experimentation. An infinite sequence of agents arrive at a server which processes them at an unknown rate. The number of agents served at each date is either: a geometric random variable in the good state, or zero in the bad state. The queue lengthens with each new arrival and shortens if the agents are served or choose to quit the queue. Agents can only observe the evolution of the queue after they arrive, thus each agent solves the experimentation problem of how long to wait to learn about the probability of service. The agents, in addition, benefit from an informational externality by observing the length of the queue and the actions of other agents. There is also a negative payoff externality as those at the front of the queue delay the service of those at the back.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

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https://sites.google.com/site/carotho14/research/files/queues151109.pdf Revised version, 2015 (application/pdf)
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https://sites.google.com/site/carotho14/research/files/queues160903.pdf Revised version, 2016 (application/pdf)
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Journal Article: Strategic experimentation in queues (2019) Downloads
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