Immaculate Deception: How (and Why) Bankers Still Enjoy a Global Rescue Network

Edward Kane

No inetwp130, Working Papers Series from Institute for New Economic Thinking

Abstract: Dodd-Frank is an example of counterfeit reform. It is designed principally to benefit very big banks and it has helped these banks to increase their market share greatly during the last 10 years. The Act provides lesser and contradictory forms of costs and comfort to smaller US bankers and taxpayers, foreign bankers (especially the managers of Deutsche Bank), and foreign governments. Small bankers and taxpayers are encouraged to believe that the 2007-2009 US rescue of the world’s biggest banks was a one-time maneuver. But an opposite message is sent through the press as (with great fanfare) the industry absolves and congratulates ex-officeholders: (1) for having transferred massive amounts of subsidized support not just to stakeholders in US megabanks, but also to European bankers and governments, and (2) for keeping the subsidies flowing long past the panic’s expiry date. Genuine reform will require changes in fraud laws and an effort to post on a continuing basis the value of the safety-net subsidies individual megabanks enjoy.

Keywords: Too big to fail; financial safety; financial reform; financial crises; implicit subsidies; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E02 E32 E42 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2020-07-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-pay
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:thk:wpaper:inetwp130

DOI: 10.36687/inetwp130

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