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Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Hassan Benchekroun () and Amrita Ray Chaudhuri ()

No 2012-021, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center

Abstract: Abstract: This paper shows that, if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies may jeopardize the chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. The grand coalition may be destabilized by the implementation of cleaner technologies, ultimately resulting in higher global emissions and lower global welfare. We further show that the higher the stock of pollution at the instant when the cleaner technology is implemented, the more likely that the above mechanism unfolds. We examine a reduction in the emission per output ratio as well as measures that enhance the natural rate of decay of stock pollutants.

Keywords: transboundary pollution; renewable resource; clean technologies; coalition formation; differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q20 Q54 Q55 Q58 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Related works:
Journal Article: Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements (2012) Downloads
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