Preventing Abuse by Controlling Shareholders
Eric van Damme
No 2012-038, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center
Abstract: This paper is a comment on Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwarz “Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex Ante Control Mechanisms versus Ex Post Transaction Review”. Together with that paper it will appear in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 169 (1) in 2013, in a special issue devoted to Behavioral Theory of Institutions. I argue that the arguments of Gilson and Schwarz are convincing, but that the underlying assumptions may be stronger than the authors suggest. In particular, the G&S paper adopts a US shareholder perspective on corporate governance and is based on standard rationality assumptions. In this comment, I discuss whether and to what extent the recommendations are relevant in the EU context and whether the paper’s conclusions are robust when insights from behavioral economics are included.
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Behavioral Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G38 K22 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Preventing Abuse by Controlling Shareholders (2013)
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