Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry

Ville Korpela

No 108, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with the path-braking result of Maskin [Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38.], and therefore, it allows us to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the collective.

Keywords: Characterization; Implementation; Nash equilibrium; Other regarding preferences; Procedural fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D64 D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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