Assessing Borda's Rule and Its Modifications

Hannu Nurmi ()
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Hannu Nurmi: Department of Political Science, University of Turku

No 15, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: The Borda Count (BC) is a positional voting procedure fairly often applied in nonpolitical choice settings. It has a usual mixture of good and bad theoretical properties. It is monotonic and consistent and excludes the election of an eventual Condorcet loser. It, however, does not necessarily choose the Condorcet winner when one exists. Its strategic properties have also been found unattractive. Some modifications to it have therefore been proposed, notably Nanson's method. We also compare the BC with two of its recent modifications, the modified Borda Count (MBC) and the quota Borda system (QBS). It turns out that, although similar in spirit to BC, MBC and QBS do not share one of the former's main justifications: the exclusion of an eventual Condorcet loser. It is also shown that QBS tends to lead to more majoritarian outcomes than BC.

Keywords: Borda Count; NansonÕs method; Condorcet winner; Condorcet loser; monotonicity; consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18
Date: 2007-03
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