Candidate Exit and Voter Loyalty during Early Democratization

Torun Dewan, Christopher Kam, Jaakko Meriläinen () and Janne Tukiainen
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Torun Dewan: Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science
Christopher Kam: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia
Jaakko Meriläinen: Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics

No 178, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) proposed that organiza tions persist when loyalty tempers incentives to exit after adverse shocks. We test this argument using newly digitized individual-level voting records from 28 English constituencies (1832-1868), covering 134,000 real votes. Voters could exit by switching parties, use voice by splitting their two votes between opposing parties, or remain loyal. Exploiting favorite candidates’ exit as a negative shock to the choice set, we show that candidate exits increased party switching more than expressing voice. We show that candidate exit initially induces substantial voter exit and voice, especially among Liberal voters, but that these responses attenuate sharply by the mid-1860s, consistent with the consolidation of party organizations and the emergence of durable partisan loyalty.

Keywords: candidate turnover; electoral volatility; exit-voice-loyalty; party loyalty; political development; vote switching; voting behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 N43 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 68
Date: 2026-03
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