A conflict-free arbitration scheme in a large population

Hannu Vartiainen ()

No 34, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: This paper studies allocations that can be implemented by an arbitrator subject to the constraint that the agents' outside option is to start bargaining by themselves. As the population becomes large, the set of implementable allocations shrinks to a singleton point - the conflict-free allocation. Finally, the conflict-free allocation can be implemented via a simple "lobbying" game where parties composed of agents with similar preferences bid for the right to be the first proposer in a bargaining game among the parties, i.e. in the "political game".

Keywords: non-cooperative bargaining; arbitration; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2008-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ace-economics.fi/kuvat/dp34.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp34

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Susmita Baulia ().