One-deviation principle in coalition formation

Hannu Vartiainen ()

No 35, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: We study coalitional one-deviation principle in a framework a la Chwe (1994). The principle requires that an active coalition or any of its subcoalition will not benefit from a single deviation to a strategy that specifies, for each history of coalitional moves, an active coalition and its move. A strategy meeting the one-deviation property is characterized. Moreover, it is shown to exist. Finally, the results are compared to the existing theories of coalitional games.

Keywords: one-deviation principle; coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2008-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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