The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget
Heikki Kauppi and
No 45, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics
It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states are able to establish rules or contracts that restrict the budget allocation in advance. In the current status quo, France and Spain are the clearest winners of these restrictions, while Austria, Finland and Sweden, not to mention the new member states, suffer largest losses.
Keywords: EU budget; voting power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eec and nep-gth
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Working Paper: The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp45
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