The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring

Hitoshi Matsushima

No CIRJE-F-123, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is imperfect and private, and players' private signal structures satisfy the conditional independence. We require almost no conditions concerning the accuracy of private signals. We assume that there exist no public signals and no public randomization devices, and players cannot communicate and use only pure strategies. It is shown that the Folk Theorem holds in that every individually rational feasible payoff vector can be approximated by a sequential equilibrium payoff vector. Moreover, the Folk Theorem holds even if each player has no knowledge of her opponent's private signal structure.

Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2001-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf123

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