Starategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One's Own Private Value in Auctions

Eric Rasmusen ()

No CIRJE-F-127, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: Bidders have to decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating their own values in auctions. This can explain sniping - flurries of bids late in auctions with deadlines - as the result of bidders trying to avoid stimulating other bidders into examining their bid ceiling more carefully.

Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2001-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2001/2001cf127.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in Auctions (2006)
Working Paper: Strategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One’s Own Private Value in Auctions (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf127

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