Randomization, Communication and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Michihiro Kandori

No CIRJE-F-139, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: The present paper shows that the Folk Theorem under imperfect (public) information (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994)) can be obtained under much weaker set of assumptions, if we allow communication among players. Our results in particular show that for generic symmetric games with at least four players, we can drop the FLM condition on the number of actions and signals altogether and prove the folk theorem under the same condition as in the perfect monitoring case.

Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2001-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf139

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